The Federal Reserve on net purchased almost $4 trillion in additional securities between March 2009 and December 2014. Although the initial announcements of these policies were associated with dramatic market reactions, these responses were soon reversed. The overall market reaction to news surprises from the Federal Reserve over this period was increases, not decreases, in interest rates. It is hard to disentangle the effects of the purchases themselves from new information about economic fundamentals. My conclusion is that it is difficult to estimate accurately what large-scale asset purchases accomplished, but the magnitude of the effect is likely smaller than commonly believed.
that further increases in the monetary base would yield essentially zero marginal liquidity benefits to a holder of the monetary base, purchasing any asset with the newly created base should not change the price of any statecontingent claims, and so should have zero effect on asset prices or spending decisions in many models (Eggertsson and Woodford 2003) . Richer models allow for the possibility of some effects. For example, buying long-term assets may commit the fiscal or monetary authority to a different statecontingent path for distortionary taxes or inflation (Hamilton and Wu 2012; Eggertsson and Proulx 2016) . Or if some assets confer unique benefits on certain institutions-for example, as collateral for repurchase agreements or to satisfy capital requirements-there could also be real effects from altering the supply of these special assets (Woodford 2012; Caballero and Farhi 2017) . Real effects can also arise in models where some individuals are unable to hold certain assets (Cúrdia and Woodford 2011; Gertler and Karadi 2011; Chen, Cúrdia, and Ferrero 2012; Greenwood and Vayanos 2014) . Granting the potential relevance of such mechanisms, the Securities, November 19, 2008 , to December 27, 2017 magnitude of the effect that can be achieved by LSAPs is very much an empirical question. Figure 2 plots some dramatic evidence that might seem to settle this issue. The graph shows the interest rate on a 10-year U.S. Treasury security each minute of the day on March 18, 2009. At 2:15 p.m. EDT on that day, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) issued a statement announcing its intention to purchase up to an additional $1.15 trillion in mortgagebacked securities, long-term Treasury securities, and agency debt beyond the purchases announced previously. Within minutes of this announcement, the long-term Treasury rate fell by 50 basis points. It would be impossible to argue that the cause of this decline was something other than the Fed's announcement. When one adds this together with a few other dramatic moves-such as the 20-basis-point drop on November 25, 2008, when the Fed announced its initial intention to purchase up to $600 billion in mortgage-backed securities and agency debt-it seems one can make a strong case that the first quantitative easing (QE1), as the first phase of LSAPs came to be called, may have lowered long-term yields by 100 basis points or more.
However, it is then interesting to look at figure 3, which shows what happened after the Fed's subsequent meeting on April 29, 2009. The Fed did not announce any change in plans for LSAPs in this statement, and indeed confirmed its intention to continue conducting the purchases announced on March 18. Yet just as we are forced to conclude that something the Fed said on March 18 caused the 10-year yield to fall, it is equally clear that something the Fed said (or did not say) on April 29 caused the yield to jump up by almost 10 basis points. What was it?
Here was the assessment of William Sullivan, chief economist at JVB Financial Group, as quoted in the Reuters bond market wrap-up for that day (Reuters 2018) :
Treasuries prices fell because the Fed's statement has been adjusted to confirm its observation that some "green shoots" of stability and potential improvement in the economic environment are evident. . . . Also, some observers perhaps thought that the Fed would be able to increase the amount of Treasury and mortgagebacked securities purchases over and above the amount they delineated at the March policy meeting. So it doesn't look as if they will increase the size of those purchase programs.
To the extent that Sullivan's second explanation is accurate-that the market was surprised not to see additional purchases beyond those that had been announced on March 18-it raises the possibility that the initial 50-basis-point drop on March 18 should not be interpreted as the effect of the policy the Fed actually implemented, but rather as a potential effect of some policy that markets thought the Fed might implement, though in practice it did not actually do so. Sullivan's first interpretationthat the market was responding to the Fed's more optimistic assessment of economic fundamentals-was the primary factor cited in the rest of the Reuters news account. The April 29 statement made significan changes in the words that the Fed used to describe the economy. The Fed sounded considerably less pessimistic on April 29 than it had on March 18 (see table 1) .
A market response to these improvements in the Fed's outlook could be interpreted in two different ways. One view maintains that the Fed's information about the economy is a strict subset of the market's. According to this view, the market knew the true condition of the economy, and it had Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in March indicates that the economy has continued to contract, though the pace of contraction appears to be somewhat slower. Job losses, declining equity and housing wealth, and tight credit conditions have weighed on consumer sentiment and spending.
Household spending has shown signs of stabilizing but remains constrained by ongoing job losses, lower housing wealth, and tight credit. Weaker sales prospects and difficulties in obtaining credit have led businesses to cut back on inventories and fixed investment. U.S. exports have slumped as a number of major trading partners have also fallen into recession.
Weak sales prospects and difficulties in obtaining credit have led businesses to cut back on inventories, fixed invest ent, and staffing
Although the near-term economic outlook is weak, the Committee anticipates that policy actions to stabilize financia markets and institutions, together with fiscal and monetary stimulus, wil contribute to a gradual resumption of sustainable economic growth.
Although the economic outlook has improved modestly since the March meeting, partly reflecting some easing of financial market conditions, economi activity is likely to remain weak for a time. Nonetheless, the Committee continues to anticipate that policy actions to stabilize financial markets and institutions, fisca and monetary stimulus, and market forces will contribute to a gradual resumption of sustainable economic growth in a context of price stability.
Source: Statements of the Federal Open Market Committee. a guess about but did not know the Fed's assessment for sure. On learning that the Fed was more optimistic than anticipated, the market participants would revise their expectations of future monetary policy, now expecting perhaps fewer LSAPs or an earlier liftoff from the ELB. The second view is that the market and the Fed each has some information about the economy that the other does not have. According to this view, the release of the Fed's more optimistic assessment rationally leads to an upward revision of the market's forecast of economic fundamentals, and could lead to higher interest rates per this mechanism. Direct comparisons of private forecasts with those of the Federal Reserve's Greenbook have demonstrated that the Fed has some information that is useful for forecasting output and inflation beyond what is known to the private sector (Romer and Romer 2000; Faust and Wright 2009 ). If the Fed knows some things that private analysts do not know, and private analysts know some things that the Fed does not know, the rational response of a private actor to the revelation of the Fed's economic assessment is to revise his or her own assessment (Melosi, forthcoming; Miranda-Agrippino and Ricco 2018) . Much research has convincingly shown that this channel is an important component of the typical market response to Fed statements and actions. Jeffrey Campbell and others (2012) found that from 1994 to 2007, when the Fed announced an interest rate that was higher than the market anticipated, this was associated with a move to lower forecasts of unemployment and higher forecasts of inflation in the Blue Chip consensus forecast, exactly the opposite of what is predicted by the first view (the Fed is going to be more contractionary than anticipated) and exactly what is predicted by the second view (the economy is in better shape than people thought). Emi Nakamura and Jón Steinsson (2018) confirmed this finding in a careful analysis of high-frequency data through 2014. Additional evidence in support of this view has been provided by Silvia Miranda-Agrippino and Giovanni Ricco (2018) and by Aemit Lakdawala and Matthew Schaffer (2018).
If information that the economy was in better shape than many private analysts had previously concluded was indeed one factor driving rates up on April 29, 2009, we also need to allow the possibility that the Fed's negative economic assessment, and not just the LSAPs, were factors driving rates down on March 18. To the extent that is the case, it would mean that the 50-basis-point drop observed on March 18 is an overestimate of the effect of LSAPs themselves on the long-term rate.
It is even more telling to note the scale of the vertical axis in figures 2 and 3. The 10-year rate began March 18 at 2.97 percent and began April 29 at 3.00 percent. Thus some sort of news arriving after the March 18 meeting and before the April 29 meeting led to a complete reversal of the dramatic drop of 50 basis points on March 18. And by the end of April 29, the rate was significantly higher than it had started out before the March 18 announcement. Was this information arriving between March 19 and April 28 news about what the Fed was going to do, or news about other fundamentals that matter for bond prices?
A recent paper by David Greenlaw and others (2018) used two approaches to try to answer this question. Their first approach was to note the date of every single FOMC meeting, release of minutes, or speech by the Fed chair about the economy or monetary policy. They called these "Fed Days." Figure 4 plots the cumulative change in the 10-year rate coming only on Fed Days from November 20, 2008, to December 1, 2017. 1 After some dramatic initial drops, the overall movement of the market on Fed Days subsequent to March 18, 2009, was up for the remainder of the bond Source: Adapted by the author from the data set given by Greenlaw and others (2018 purchases of QE1, a period during which the Fed was intending that its LSAP would help hold rates down. The overall market move on Fed Days during both QE2 and QE3 was also unquestionably up, not down. The second approach taken by Greenlaw and others (2018) was to look at every day when the 10-year yield changed by more than 1 standard deviation and study the Reuters bond market wrap-up for that day. If Reuters described news about the Fed as the primary driver of bond prices on that day, it was designated a "Reuters Fed News Day." If Reuters listed the Fed as one of two contributing factors, the day was given a weight of ½. Figure 5 plots the cumulative change in the 10-year rate on Reuters Fed News Days. By including a larger set of days than considered in figure 4 on which there was information released to the market about Fed policy, these suggest a bigger role for Fed announcements in bringing rates down in the fall of 2008. But the conclusion remains that the overall effect of news from the Fed after March 18 and throughout QE2 and QE3 was to drive interest rates higher.
Another event that many people consider convincing evidence of the importance of LSAPs came on May 22, 2013, when Fed chair Ben Bernanke suggested in congressional testimony that the Fed might slow the rate of monthly net bond purchases within the next three FOMC meetings. Source: Adapted by the author from the data set given by Greenlaw and others (2018) The 10-year yield rose 11 basis points that day, a development that subsequently came to be referred to as the "Taper Tantrum." But this was the only change in May that either of the methodologies used by Greenlaw and others (2018) would associate with news from the Fed. Notwithstanding, the rate was up overall 45 basis points in May (figure 6). The key factors identified by Reuters as driving yields higher in May included a strong employment report on May 3 and favorable housing and consumer sentiment data released on May 28. It is also worth noting the market's nonresponse to the Fed's more recent decision to begin reducing the size of its balance sheet. Greenlaw and others (2018) noted that both the Blue Chip consensus and the primary dealer survey in January 2017 were anticipating that the Fed would not begin reducing its balance sheet until June 2018. These surveys expected that total Fed assets would still be $3.8 trillion to $4.0 trillion by the end of 2019. The actual shrinkage began in October 2017, three quarters earlier than the market initially expected, and announced a target balance sheet for the end of 2019 of $3.6 trillion. Significant information arrived during 2017 that the Fed was going to contract sooner and faster than many expected. But it is difficult to identify any significant market reaction to this. Greenlaw and others described this as the "Shrinkage Shrug."
These observations raise doubts not just about the magnitude of the effects of LSAPs but also about the whole strategy of identifying the Source: Greenlaw and others (2018, exhibit 5.3 The idea behind high-frequency identification is that one can measure the isolated contribution of each source of news by the market response within a narrow window of the first release of this news. Consider taking this view to its logical conclusion. Equity futures tumbled 5 percent within hours after Donald Trump was predicted to win the 2016 presidential election in the evening of November 8, only to regain it all by noon the next day. According to the strict event study methodology, the interpretation would have to be that Trump's election did indeed take 5 percent off the value of U.S. corporations, but that some other shock within hours added this amount back. A more natural interpretation is that there are limits to investors' ability to understand, within minutes, all the implications of untested and unclear policies (Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2018) . Moreover, the Fed's announcements reveal not just actions that it is going to take but also its best assessment of economic fundamentals. The Fed's assessment can be important information for me for purposes of refining my own assessment of economic fundamentals. Separating the contributions of these two factors is challenging.
Let me emphasize what I am not concluding from these observations. I have been discussing only the effects of the Fed's LSAP programs and their huge expansion initiated in March 2009. This does not say anything about the efficacy of the Fed's emergency lending facilities implemented in the fall of 2008 (and mostly phased out by the end of 2009). Evidence from the idiosyncratic responses of different banks and money market funds to the lending facilities suggests that these programs may well have had beneficial effects (for example, Duygan-Bump and others 2013). Nor am I suggesting that LSAPs had no effects on bond prices. As noted above, figure 2 makes such a claim difficult to defend. But I do conclude that it is very hard to accurately estimate the magnitude of exactly what LSAPs accomplished, and that the magnitude of their true effects is likely to be smaller than many central banks believe.
GENERAL DISCUSSION James Hamilton responded to comments from Eric Swanson. He argued that Swanson's theory that unconventional monetary policy can have large effects at the effective lower bound (ELB) is more related to forward guidance than to large-scale asset purchases (LSAPs). Hamilton noted that his own choice in studying the Federal Reserve's policy announcement in March 2009 was because it was the most obvious, clear example of a "true" LSAP program, not because its effects seemed to die out. Hamilton further noted that Swanson counted the March 2009 FOMC policy announcement by the Fed as a "pure" policy shock. Hamilton instead argued that disentangling the actual effect of the LSAP program from the signaling effect was quite difficult. He further clarified that his argument is not that LSAPs had no effect, but that their effects are very easy to overestimate. Janet Yellen agreed with Eric Swanson's conclusion that the bulk of evidence does suggest that LSAPs had a significant effect on interest rates and the economy. She did, however, agree with James Hamilton that it is difficult to disentangle the direct effect of asset purchases from changes in the public's expectations of future interest rates and the public's interpretation of the Fed's outlook for the economy when asset purchases are announced. She noted that although they would not be her preferred tool, she believed that LSAPs should remain a part of the Fed's tool kit. She noted that it was difficult to see the adverse side effects of LSAPs, despite the concerns by many that these effects would be large. In addition, she noted that forward guidance also seems quite important; hence, her focus on enhancing its role as part of the Fed's framework.
Eric Swanson shared some of James Hamilton's concerns about high-frequency event study estimates of the effects of the Fed's LSAPs. Estimates of LSAP effects should not rely only on these types of studies. However, he noted that substantial evidence from a variety of methods, data sets, and countries shows similar effects. These other studies thus corroborate the high-frequency event study estimates.
Kristin Forbes asked Eric Swanson about the practicality of implementing negative interest rates in the United States. She suggested that although a number of countries implemented negative interest rates after the Great Recession, the feasibility of such a policy varied across countries. For example, in the United Kingdom, the Bank of England had worried that setting interest rates below 0.5 percent would lead to problems for building societies and other segments of the financial sector. Would other countries, particularly those with similarly large financia sectors, face similar constraints-or other types of concerns? Second, Forbes asked Yellen about her proposed "makeup" strategy for monetary policy after an ELB episode. Though Forbes understands the intuition behind "overshooting" and providing additional monetary policy accommodation after a period at the ELB, she wonders about the time horizon for such a policy. For example, if inflation expectations are well grounded, but inflation had been below target for almost a decade, should the makeup period also extend for as long as a decade? Forbes suggested a shorter period.
Janet Yellen responded to Forbes by noting that, if such a makeup policy were put in place before a recession, significant undershooting of the Fed's inflation target might not actually occur in the first place, because the Fed would be promising to provide additional accommodation in the future, shifting the public's expectations. If such a long period of undershooting did occur, then Yellen acknowledged the risk that a long makeup policy could unanchor inflation expectations by overshooting for too long. In such a scenario, the Fed might want to temper its approach.
Raghuram Rajan noted that, as an academic and former leader of a central bank, he was surprised at how many of the basic facts about monetary policy during the global financial crisis are still in dispute. He noted debate during discussion of Ben Bernanke's paper in the panel's previous session about whether Taylor Rule residuals were positive or negative before the crisis, and consequently whether policy was too accommodative. In the context of the current discussion, he noted ongoing debate about whether the effects of the LSAPs were actually positive, and whether unconventional monetary policy had a significant effect on exchange rates and capital flows. He viewed this debate as an indicator that further research is still needed.
Rajan focused on Kristin Forbes's comments, and he noted his pleasure that someone was willing to publicly acknowledge that exchange rates matter for setting monetary policy, as many central bankers had refused to do in the past. Rajan asked Forbes whether exchange rates are an important channel for central bankers to consider when conducting unconventional monetary policy. For example, it seemed that one reason the European Central Bank (ECB) began asset purchases was because most other central banks were conducting asset purchases, even while the ECB was not, causing an unwanted appreciation of the euro. He asked whether exchange rates and the cross-border transmission of policy should be considered in future debates about unconventional monetary policy.
Joshua Hausman noted his surprise that the panel did not discuss the case of Japan's unconventional monetary policy, and he asked what lessons they would take from unconventional monetary policy conducted as part of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's "Abenomics" policy program. Particularly, he noted the country's failure to get inflation to its 2 percent target, despite dramatic and unconventional policy actions, such as yield curve control (that is, setting the 10-year government bond yield at 0 percent). Mark Gertler acknowledged James Hamilton's critique of event study analysis in evaluating the effects of quantitative easing (QE), but Gertler struck a more optimistic tone about the policy. Specificall , he noted that the Federal Reserve's purchases of agency mortgage-backed securities were quite effective. The mechanism through which the policy acted was to affect excess returns on long-term securities that were unusually high due to financial market frictions. Without these frictions, such a policy would not have been effective, because speculators would arbitrage away the excess returns. During the global financial crisis, however, these frictions were clearly present because excess returns persisted. For government bonds, the excess returns manifested through higher term premiums. Though term premiums are quite difficult to measure, the interest rate spreads on assetbacked securities over government bonds were quite elevated. After QE1 was first announced in December 2008 and then implemented in March 2009, these spreads compressed. The same occurred after the announcement and implementation of QE3. Gertler viewed this as evidence of QE's effectiveness. Hamilton asked a clarifying question as to whether Gertler believed these financial frictions were persistent through the end of 2014, after QE3 was implemented. Gertler expressed his confidence that frictions were present for a few years after the crisis, but that it was not clear exactly how long they persisted. Janet Yellen commented on the difficult experience of Japan, and saw the country's experience as a warning for how important it is to get infltion up after a binding ELB period. Yellen noted that inflation expectations in Japan had likely fallen and that such a phenomenon is a very difficult process to reverse.
Eric Swanson noted that monetary policy in Japan in the early 2000s was not very good. For example, the Bank of Japan only conducted asset purchases in a very superficial way, buying very-short-term government bonds. As a result, the Bank of Japan's policies had relatively little effect and the Japanese economy seems to have fallen into a deflationary expectations equilibrium. Swanson pointed to research by S. Boragan Aruoba, Pablo Cuba-Borda, and Frank Schorfheide that shows the United States is in a "normal" equilibrium and Japan is in a deflationary equilibrium. 1 Once Japan fell into a de ationary equilibrium, Swanson argued, it became much harder for it to extricate itself and return to the normal equilibrium.
Kristin Forbes noted that Japan could be a good case study of how unconventional monetary policy works through exchange rates, perhaps to a greater degree than conventional monetary policy, as suggested by Raghuram Rajan. Japan's unconventional monetary policy resulted in large exchange rate movements that seemed to fuel much of the policy's economic stimulus. Studying this dynamic also addresses the potential spillovers of unconventional monetary policy working through different channels. Forbes expressed her surprise, when she joined the Bank of England as a Monetary Policy Committee member, about how exchange rate movements were incorporated into inflation forecasts and monetary policy decisions. Exchange rate shocks were modeled at the Bank of England as exogenous and resulting from risk shocks; little thought was given to other reasons why exchange rates might move and how this could determine the effects. Recent research, however, shows that exchange rate movements resulting from monetary policy shocks can result in much larger pass-through effects to inflation than exchange rate movements caused by other shocks. However, none of this was discussed at the Bank of England at the time. Forbes speculated that a possible reason may be that economists have been so ingrained to think that they cannot explain exchange rate movements, deterring them from attempting to model them.
She argued that exchange rates should be a key part of the conversation on monetary policy, especially in countries like the United Kingdom where exchange rate pass-through effects can be large. She noted, however, that while emerging markets would also like exchange rates to be a bigger part of the conversation about the spillovers from monetary policy in other countries, this would be difficult to implement for advanced economies' central banks, whose mandates are usually politically constrained to focus on the domestic sphere.
Jeff Fuhrer made two points. He first suggested looking at different ways that monetary policy might have been constrained, or ways in which it could have done more during the Great Recession. For example, he suggested looking at central banks' loss functions in the wake of the Great Recession to measure the degree of overall welfare loss incurred across different economies despite sizable monetary and fiscal actions. Such an analysis might suggest that monetary policy could have done more to right the economy. Of course, all these estimates of the loss function are dependent on the models used. Second, he noted the danger of monetary policy solutions that rely too much on expectations. For one, during a crisis, the public might not find policymakers' promises of action in the future to be credible compared with actual action taken at the time of the crisis. He noted that is striking how little economists know about how expectations are actually formed, given how much monetary policy depends on expectations. He pointed to research by the University of California, Berkeley, economist Yuriy Gorodnichenko and the University of Texas-Austin economist Olivier Coibion on expectations formations, as well as work by the Harvard economist Andrei Shleifer and his colleagues.
Athanasios Orphanides remarked on monetary policy at the ELB. He noted that it would be useful for central banks to cut interest rates faster as they approach the ELB, opting to reach the ELB quicker than conventional monetary policy rules would recommend. He and Volker Wieland recommended in a 2000 paper that the Bank of Japan implement this strategy, to no avail. 2 Likewise, they had difficulty convincing policymakers to implement a similar strategy in 2008. He emphasized that the idea of "saving ammunition," or waiting to cut interest rates down to the ELB during a time of crisis, should be permanently discarded.
Orphanides also asked the panel about negative interest rates. He noted that although there are no limits to the size of QE, there could be political effects of QE that are quite large. He noted that, instead, the Fed might consider announcing ahead of time how low it would be willing to cut interest rates in the next recession. Would it be willing to go to -1 or -1.5 percent? Announcing this ahead of time would change expectations about how likely it would be that the ELB actually binds in the future, and therefore might decrease the possibility that more controversial policies like QE would be needed at all.
Philipp Hartmann explained the ECB's experience in implementing negative interest rates. The ECB cut its deposit facility rate to -0.4 percent in four small steps between June 2014 and March 2016. New studies are now coming out about the effect of these policies, and most of the research suggests that negative interest rates worked in the euro area. However, negative interest rates might not be the most powerful instrument because there is a limit to how low they can go, and therefore to how much accommodation can be provided. For example, research by Markus Brunnermeier and Yann Kobe suggests that below a certain level the policy could become counterproductive. 3 The effects of the ECB's policy worked through the interest rate and bank lending channel. First, there was a "twist" and a "shift" in the yield curve. The twist was a result of negative rates acting as a charge on cash hoarding and triggering portfolio shifts toward long-term bonds compressing the term premium. The shift was simply a result of the removal of the nonnegativity constraint on future expected short-term rates. The second, and perhaps more surprising, positive effect of negative interest rates was through the bank lending channel. Several studies by ECB economists suggest that negative interest rates increased lending. Florian Heider, Farzad Saidi, and Glenn Schepens find this effect for the syndicated loans of banks with a relatively large share of market-based funding relative to retail-deposit based funding (because wholesale funding rates can go negative but retail rates do not, and therefore retail banks do not benefit from funding relief through negative policy rates). 4 Jens Eisenschmidt and Smets and Selva Demiralp, Eisenschmidt, and Thomas Vlassopoulos present evidence of positive lending effects for broader credit measures, including banks with large retail deposit bases. 5 The former research also find the pass-through to lending rates to remain unchanged. It should, however, be kept in mind that negative rates were introduced by the ECB in parallel with other unconventional monetary policy measures, notably targeted long-term refinancing operations and asset purchase programs. Therefore, for some of the studies not all the lending effects can be associated with negative rates alone. But they can be seen as "activating" the excess reserves induced in the system through those other measures, which would otherwise have remained idle.
Hartmann further discussed the effect of the exchange rate and agreed that the effects are country dependent. In the ECB's case, the effects also seemed to be state dependent-sometimes, the exchange rate effects of monetary policy were larger; other times, not so much. Most of the available evidence, however, suggests that there are fewer international spillovers from ECB unconventional monetary policy, particularly to emerging markets, because the euro is less of a global currency than the dollar.
Hartmann suggested that the panel discuss the cost-benefit analysis of different unconventional monetary policies given the potential for unintended side effects. He referenced this year's economic conference sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, which had captured this perspective very nicely. 6 Given the lexicographic ordering of objectives in the ECB's mandate, it is somewhat hard to say with precision which weight potential side effects should receive. He wondered how the Fed evaluated the cost-benefit trade-offs of unconventional monetary policy, for example, given their potential effects on financial stability, and how this analysis pairs with the macroprudential regulation and supervision of financial institutions Michael Kiley agreed with many of the discussants that the evidence supported the efficacy of QE; at the same time, he argued that this evidence primarily focuses on the effect of QE on financial markets, and not on the transmission of these effects to real activity or inflation. Although research in the latter areas is limited, he thought the evidence suggested that QE may have been less effective on these dimensions-which are the ultimate objective of monetary policymakers-than Eric Swanson suggested. He expressed his support for the types of makeup policies that Yellen laid out in her presentation but wondered if they would be fully credible and appreciated by the public. He suggested, instead, consideration of the simpler approach of raising the inflation target to about 3 percent. Though he acknowledged that such a move might be unpopular, he argued that another large QE program of $2 trillion to $3 trillion might be just as unpopular.
Kristin Forbes first addressed the comments by Athanasios Orphanides. She disagreed with his comment that there are no constraints on QE. She 6. Conference on "What Are the Consequences of Long Spells of Low Interest Rates," Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Boston, September 7-8, 2018, https://www.bostonfed.org/ consequences2018/agenda/. noted that QE is constrained by the characteristics of the assets and the size of the asset pool from which a central bank can purchase assets. Specificall , if a central bank could buy corporate bonds or other assets, it probably should not purchase corporate assets of the financial institutions that they regulate, or companies with significant risks. These restrictions-plus the size of the overall pool-place limits on the size of QE. But there are also other options to provide an unconventional stimulus than purchasing assets. She referenced an effective program implemented by the Bank of England known as the "funding for lending scheme." In this program, the Bank of England set up an incentive system where banks received a subsidized lending rate for increasing their total lending. The goal of the program was to more efficiently pass through the reduction in interest rates by the Bank of England to customers as interest rates approached the ELB. Forbes and other Bank of England officials were surprised at the level of participation in the program despite the slower growth of the U.K. economy. She noted that this type of program could merit further investigation by other countries.
Forbes also agreed with Philipp Hartmann that cost-benefit analysis is important in monetary policy. She noted that it is important not to disregard certain costs as outside the mandate of a given central bank, because these costs can accumulate over time, especially when interest rates are low.
Eric Swanson addressed the question from Jeff Fuhrer regarding whether the Federal Reserve could have provided additional monetary policy accommodation during the global financial crisis. Swanson argued that, in retrospect, the Fed definitely could have done more, particularly from 2009 to 2011. Stronger forward guidance could have brought the twoyear Treasury yield down from 1 percent during this period to close to 0 percent. He contended that the only reason the Fed did not do this was because it was still figuring out how to communicate forward guidance to the markets more effectively. It took the Fed until August 2011, when it implemented date-based forward guidance, to figure out how to better lower interest rate expectations.
Regarding the idea for a higher inflation target raised by Michael Kiley, Swanson mentioned a symposium at the San Francisco Federal Reserve Bank that he attended at which every participant opposed raising the infltion target. 7 The Boston College economist Peter Ireland particularly argued 7. "A New Target for Monetary Policy," symposium at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, March 2, 2018. at the symposium that, based on research in the 1990s by Martin Feldstein and others, inflation as low as 3 percent could still be quite costl . 8 Janet Yellen addressed the question of negative interest rates. She noted that when the Federal Reserve was considering cutting interest rates down to 0 percent instead of the range of 0 to 0.25 percent to which it ultimately did cut rates, it was worried about the distortionary effects of very low rates. Particularly, it was concerned about the functioning of money markets and that banks would not or could not pass through very low or negative rates to retail depositors. Yellen noted her surprise that so many European countries and Japan were able to cut interest rates to as negative a level as they did. She noted that there is some research showing the effects of negative interest rates should be evaluated through the bank lending channel, and that there could be adverse side effects. She noted that this is a topic worth studying for the Fed in the future.
Regarding a higher inflation target, Yellen suggested that solving the problem of the ELB would actually require an inflation target higher than 3 percent. An inflation target that high would call into question whether the Fed would be meeting its price stability mandate, and she doubted that Congress would consider such a high inflation target as consistent with price stability. Therefore, such a policy change would be unpopular politically.
8. Martin Feldstein, "The Costs and Benefits of Going from Low Inflation to Price Stability," in Reducing Inflation: Motivation and Strategy, edited by Christina Romer and David Romer (University of Chicago Press, 1997) .
